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Abstract 
In the context of the review of the EU economic governance framework, this study recommends 
a multi-year ahead expenditure rule anchored in an appropriate public debt target, augmented 
with an asymmetric golden rule that provides extra fiscal space only in times of a recession. An 
improved governance framework should strengthen national fiscal councils and include a 
European fiscal council, while financial sanctions should be replaced with instruments related to 
surveillance, positive incentives, market discipline and increased political cost of non-
compliance. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The European Union’s fiscal rules are subject to intense intellectual debate. The European 
Commission is currently reviewing the EU economic governance framework, including fiscal 
surveillance.  
Main findings 
• In accordance with EU law, the expenditure benchmark (EB) is subordinate to the structural 
balance (SB). The EB matters only when a country’s SB is lower than its medium-term 
objective (MTO). We find that in practice the SB is always preferred over the EB. 
• We find that that the Commission has adopted a generally lenient approach in cases of 
conflict between the EB and SB criteria, in the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. 
• Estimates of the structural budget balance are subject to enormous uncertainty, while 
uncertainty is minor in the estimates of medium-term potential growth.  
• We find that the Commission’s revised estimates of May 2020 are much more pro-cyclical 
for the structural budget balance than for the medium-term potential growth1. 
• There are many good reasons to reform the EU fiscal framework and there is an emerging 
consensus in the literature on the benefits of an expenditure rule. 
• Even in 2019, general governments’ net investment (which is gross investment minus the 
depreciation of capital stock) on average in the EU was just a fraction of investment in the 
United States and United Kingdom (as a share of GDP). Some countries with low public 
debts invest little, which seems to be a political choice not related to fiscal rules. It is an 
open question whether fiscal rules or market pressure influence public investment in high-
debt countries in times of fiscal consolidation. 
• The usefulness of the current EU investment clause is questionable.  
• Views on the desirability of a golden rule differ. 
• The institutional framework for overseeing the rules is as important as the rules 
themselves. 
Recommendations 
We recommend changing the EU fiscal framework to include the following main elements: 
 
1 A pro-cyclical revision means that the estimate is revised in the same direction as the revision of the economic 
outlook. 
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o Anchor: five-year ahead or seven-year ahead debt ratio change objective, to be set by a 
joint effort of the government of the country concerned, the national fiscal council, the 
European Fiscal Council and the European Commission, and be approved by the Council; 
o Operational target: multi-year ahead ceilings for public expenditure corrected for 
discretionary2 unemployment expenditure, interest expenditure and discretionary 
revenue changes, while public investment is treated as discussed in the next point; 
o Public investment: an asymmetric golden rule that excludes net public investment from 
the considered expenditure aggregate only in bad times, in a way to create extra fiscal 
space. This extra fiscal space would be gradually eliminated as the recovery strengthens; 
o Current and investment budgets should be separated, and investment costs would be 
distributed over the entire service-life. Activation of the asymmetric golden rule should 
not be based on unreliable estimates of the output gap, but on the contraction of 
economic output, and the opinion of national and European fiscal councils and the 
European Commission; 
o The ceiling for the operational target should be compatible with the debt ratio objective; 
o Institutional framework: strengthened independent national fiscal councils with increased 
minimum standards and establishment of a European Fiscal Council with a structure 
similar to the European Central Bank’s Governing Council, while the Commission remains 
the institution that proposes recommendations to the Council of Ministers for adoption; 
o Financial sanctions: to be replaced with various instruments related to surveillance, 
positive incentives, market discipline3 and increased political cost of non-compliance; and 
o A general escape clause: instead of the current general escape clause and the additional 
complex web of exceptions, a single general escape clause (possibly applied to each 
member state separately) could be triggered by the Council of Ministers, based on the 
recommendation of the Commission, which will take into account the opinions of the 
independent national fiscal council and the European Fiscal Council. 
 
  
 
2 Discretionary changes refer to changes resulting from the decisions of the authorities.  
3 Market discipline means that the interest rate at which governments can borrow from the market is sensitive to 
markets’ assessment of public debt sustainability, that is, interest rates go up as markets’ trust in fiscal sustainability 
weakens. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s fiscal framework, which originated in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 
was then set out in the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, has been subject to intense discussion 
and several waves of reform. The latest legislative reforms comprised the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ 
(2011) and ‘Two-Pack’ (2013) legislation, and the so-called Fiscal Compact (2012), which is part 
of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. A number of further adjustments have 
been made to the framework, before and after the legislative wave of 2011-20134. 
In this context, the European Commission is currently reviewing the EU economic governance 
framework, including fiscal surveillance under the Six-Pack and Two-Pack legislation (European 
Commission, 2020a).  
In theory, EU fiscal rules are conducive to all the three main goals of a fiscal framework: public 
debt sustainability, counter-cyclical macro-economic stabilisation, and protecting the quality of 
public finances. In practice, however, several Member States have fallen short of these goals. In 
these countries, the reduction of the public debt-to-GDP ratio has been insufficient, the rules 
have allowed pro-cyclical fiscal policies, and growth-enhancing public investment was cut during 
economic recessions. 
The EU fiscal framework also suffers from extreme complexity and allows for a large number of 
exceptions and escape clauses. The fiscal framework strongly relies on the estimates of 
governments’ structural budget balances, which is an indicator of the budget’s underlying 
position that excludes the impact of economic cycles (such as smaller tax revenues and larger 
unemployment benefit pay-outs in a recession) and one-off budgetary measures (such as bail-
outs of banks or temporary tax measures). While the structural budget balance is a useful 
theoretical concept, this indicator is not observable and its estimation is subject to wide margins 
of error.  
Since 2011, fiscal surveillance has also relied on an expenditure benchmark (EB) which caps public 
expenditure growth in order to help countries meet their structural budget balance objectives. 
Furthermore, since 2015 the fiscal framework includes a limited golden rule, called the 
‘investment clause’, which allows certain national co-financing of EU-related projects to be 
excluded from the fiscal indicators for temporary periods, under strict conditions5. 
At the request of the European Commission President, the European Fiscal Board (EFB) presented 
its contribution to the ongoing review of the Six-Pack and Two-Pack legislation EFB (2019a). The 
EFB proposed a simplification of the fiscal rules by focusing on a modified expenditure rule and 
a golden rule. The EFB’s proposal shares many similarities with other proposals, such as Carnot 
(2014), Andrle et al (2015), Claeys et al (2016), Benassy-Quéré et al (2018), Feld et al (2018), Darvas 
et al (2018) and OECD (2018). 
 
4 See at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/timeline-evolution-eu-economic-governance_en  
5    See Section 3.2.2 for details. 
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The goal of this briefing paper is not to provide a comprehensive assessment of the EU fiscal 
framework, but to focus on two particular issues.  
First, we examine whether an expenditure rule would be more reliable than a structural budget 
balance rule as the main operational tool for fiscal policy surveillance in the EU. This assessment 
is based on the concepts of the expenditure rule and the structural balance rule as currently 
defined in the EU fiscal framework, but we also consider alternative formulations of the 
expenditure rule suggested in the literature. In particular, we examine the counter-cyclical 
benefits of expenditure rules and assess whether some of the pro-cyclical effects of the EU’s past 
fiscal-policy recommendations to Member States could have been avoided, had they relied on 
an expenditure rule rather than the structural balance rule.  
Second, we assess the possible benefits and drawbacks of introducing a golden rule to exclude 
certain types of investment from the operational fiscal rule.  
We analyse the uncertainty in output gap, structural balance and medium-term potential growth 
estimates, and assess to what extent the revisions in the May 2020 European Commission 
economic forecast were pro-cyclical6. We review academic and institutional contributions on 
expenditure rules, structural balance rules and golden rules, including those suggested by the 
EFB. Our assessment particularly focuses on the impact of an expenditure rule and a golden rule 
on pro-cyclical policies.  
We conclude our study with some reflections on the ability of a fiscal framework, including the 
current framework and a framework based on an expenditure rule and a golden rule, to provide 
guidance in case of a large exogenous shock and its aftermath, such as is currently being 
experienced with the coronavirus pandemic. 
  
 
6 See Section 3.1.2 for the definition of pro-cyclical revisions. 
 9 
 THE ROLE OF THE STRUCTURAL BALANCE AND THE 
EXPENDITURE BENCHMARK IN THE EU FISCAL 
FRAMEWORK 
In addition to the two EU Treaty-based fiscal limits, namely the 3 percent of GDP budget deficit 
and the 60 percent of GDP gross public debt, the EU fiscal framework includes numerical targets 
for the structural balance and public expenditures. Section 2.1 briefly introduces the structural 
balance rules, while Section 2.2 explores the expenditure benchmark and its role. Section 2.3 
describes the conditions for compliance with the adjustment path toward the medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) under the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. Finally, 
Section 2.4 argues that the “structural balance change” criterion is preferred to the expenditure 
benchmark in the Commission’s practice, based on research of the EFB and our new research. 
2.1. Structural balance rules 
In accordance with the current fiscal framework, the structural budget balance (that is, the budget 
balance that excludes the impact of the economic cycle and one-off fiscal measures) must be 
higher than the country-specific MTO, which, in the case of EMU countries, has to be chosen at 
or above -0.5 percent of GDP, or -1 percent for countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 
percent. If the structural balance is lower than the MTO, it must increase by 0.5 percent of GDP 
per year as a baseline, while the required magnitude depends on the economic cycle and the 
level of public debt (Table 1). Throughout this study, we refer to this rule as ‘structural balance 
change rule’, which is often referred by the Commission as ‘required fiscal adjustment’ or 
‘required structural effort’.  
Table 1: Required annual fiscal adjustment depending on the state of the economy and public 
debt 
 
Source: page 17 of the 2019 Vade Mecum (European Commission, 2019b). 
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2.2. The expenditure benchmark 
The expenditure benchmark (EB) was introduced in the 2011 six-pack reform as an additional 
indicator used to assess compliance with the preventive arm of the SGP7. Compliance with the EB 
aims at moving countries towards or maintaining their MTO, as explained below. Three alternative 
cases can be distinguished8: 
o Member States at their MTO (i.e. structural balance level = MTO) must ensure that a 
measure of expenditures does not increase beyond their country’s medium-term 
potential economic growth rate (“g”), unless the increased spending is matched by 
discretionary revenue increases. Note that, in this case, the EB does not reflect any 
required improvement, but is simply indicative of the maximum growth rate of net 
expenditures compatible with the Member State remaining at the MTO.  
o Member States below their MTO (i.e. structural balance level < MTO), and thus on their 
adjustment path towards the MTO, must ensure that a measure of their expenditures 
grows at a slower pace than g, unless the increased spending is matched by discretionary 
revenue increases. 
o When Member States exceed their MTO (i.e. structural balance level > MTO), the EB is not 
taken into consideration in the assessment of the compliance with EU fiscal rules, unless 
the overachievement resulted from significant revenue windfalls or the budgetary plan 
laid out in the stability programme risks falling below the MTO. 
The expenditure aggregate excludes interest expenditures, expenditures on Union programmes 
fully matched by Union funds revenue and non-discretionary changes in unemployment benefit 
expenditure. 
In 2016, the Commission and the Council agreed to update the SGP in a joint opinion (Economic 
and Financial Committee, 2016). The innovations introduced include (i) giving more prominent 
role to the EB when assessing compliance in the preventive arm of the SGP and (ii) incorporating 
the EB into the corrective arm of the SGP9.   
The first innovation introduced the EB as part of the adjustment requirements, alongside changes 
concerning the structural balance. Until then, the EB was only used in assessing compliance, not 
in setting adjustment requirements (which were defined exclusively in terms of the structural 
balance). Since that opinion, adjustment requirements are defined in terms of changes in both 
the structural balance and the EB. 
The 2016 opinion also clarified what should be done in cases where the structural balance and 
EB produce conflicting results. While the two indicators are theoretically equivalent, they often 
differ in practice10. Indeed, they are implemented by using different aggregates and data inputs 
 
7 The Commission proposed to replace the SB with EB, but Member States preferred to keep both.  
8 See section 1.3.6 of the Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact European Commission (2019b). 
9 See Section 2.2.1 of EFB (2018) for details. 
10 See Box II.2.1 of European Commission (2011) for a proof of the theoretical equivalence. 
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(ECA, 2018). To deal with conflicting cases, the opinion calls for an “overall assessment”, which 
practically means applying judgement and choosing the most reliable indicator (EFB, 2018). Note 
that this clarification simply formalised what was already the common Commission’s practice.  
The second innovation incorporated the EB into the corrective arm of the SGP. Until then, the 
fiscal targets under the corrective arm of the Pact were expressed in structural balance and 
nominal balance terms only. Since the 2016 opinion, countries found to have an excessive deficit 
are required to define an EB target (in addition to their nominal and structural budget balance 
targets). This EB target limits the growth of government expenditure, so as to move countries 
under the corrective arm towards their nominal and structural budget balance targets11. 
However, as noted in EFB (2018), it is not clear what happens in cases of conflict between the 
different corrective arm targets, i.e. when the EB suggests non-compliance while the structural 
balance suggests compliance, or vice versa. The new rule for the corrective arm still needs to be 
tested in practice, as it applies to excessive deficit procedures instigated since 2017. As no 
excessive deficit procedure has been launched since 2017, it is not possible to assess the 
implementation of the EB rule in the corrective arm.  
According to the Commission spring 2020 forecast, 26 EU countries will have a budget deficit 
larger than 3% of GDP in 2020 and 13 countries in 2021 and therefore many excessive deficit 
procedures will likely be launched once the pandemic-induced suspension of fiscal rules will be 
revoked. Then it will be interesting to observe the implementation of the EB in the corrective arm. 
2.3. Assessing compliance with the adjustment path towards the 
MTO12 
For Member States that do not achieve their MTO, compliance with the preventive arm of the 
SGP requires them to be on the adjustment path towards the MTO – as defined in terms of 
changes in the SB and the EB indicators. Ex ante, finding significant deviation is a warning. Ex 
post, observed significant deviation acts as the trigger for a Significant Deviation Procedure. 
Member States are compliant with the adjustment path if both indicators are respected. If either 
one of the adjustment path indicators is not respected, then, and as described above, discretion 
is advised in choosing the indicator deemed most reliable – this is the so-called ‘overall 
assessment’ (see Table 2).  
The overall assessment can conclude that there is compliance, or some deviation, or a significant 
deviation from the requirements. Assigning “significant deviation status” requires that at least 
one adjustment path indicator be in significant deviation. If significant deviation is observed on 
 
11 Note however that the computation of EB under the corrective arm (compared to the budgetary targets set by the 
Council) differs from the computation of EB in the preventive arm (compared to medium-term growth rate of 
potential output). The methodological discrepancy leads to material differences in practices. See Section 2.2.1 of EFB 
(2018) for details. 
12 This section summarises the procedures set out in the Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact (European 
Commission, 2019). 
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both indicators, then significant deviation is presumed. However, even in this case, an overall 
assessment is required before significant deviation status is assigned. 
 
 
Table 2: Assessments under the preventive arm 
 
Source: Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact (European Commission, 2019b). 
Note: the expression “threshold of significance” refers to cases when (i) the deviation of the structural balance from 
the appropriate adjustment path is at least 0.5% of GDP in one single year or at least 0.25% of GDP on average per 
year in two consecutive years; and/or (ii) an excess of the rate of growth of expenditure net of discretionary revenue 
measures over the appropriate adjustment path defined in relation to the reference medium-term rate of growth has 
had a negative impact on the government balance of at least 0.5 of a percentage point of GDP in one single year, or 
cumulatively in two consecutive years. 
2.4. Privileging the structural balance 
In accordance with Regulation (EU) N.o.1175/2011, which established the expenditure benchmark 
(EB), the EB has a subordinate status relative to the structural balance (SB), because the EB is only 
used to evaluate sufficient progress towards the MTO, or in the rare case when a country is exactly 
at the MTO. The EB does not matter once a country has a higher structural balance than the 
MTO13. 
Even in cases where a country has not yet reached its MTO (i.e. structural balance level < MTO), 
research by the EFB finds that the Commission and the Council have privileged the structural 
budget balance when assessing compliance with the adjustment path, even though, since the 
 
13 Unless there was a “significant revenue windfall” or if the budgetary plan formulated in the stability programme risks 
falling below the MTO. We note, however, that a significant revenue windfall must be taken into account in the 
estimation of the structural balance, so it seems redundant to include such a clause in the Regulation. 
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2016 opinion, the two indicators should be given equal weight before an overall assessment is 
made.  
The EFB (2018 and 2019) highlighted that the Commission adopted ad hoc adjustments to the 
expenditure benchmark when it was in conflict with the structural balance change rule. In 
particular, in the cases of Portugal and Slovenia, the Commission questioned the appropriateness 
of potential output estimates based on the Commonly Agreed Methodology (CAM) and used 
alternative ad hoc output gap estimations to corroborate its conclusion, which was more lenient 
than what the expenditure benchmark based on the CAM would have concluded. 
Slovenia would have been non-compliant without these adjustments. For Portugal the conclusion 
was: “There is currently no sufficient ground to conclude on the existence of an observed significant 
deviation in Portugal in 2018”14. Yet, in the same document, the Commission projects a “significant 
deviation” for both 2019 and 2020 for Portugal. This example shows how even a relaxed EB can 
be subordinated to the structural balance rule in practice. 
To complement the EFB’s findings, which presented a qualitative analysis of some cases for the 
Commission’s assessment of Member States’ compliance with the preventive arm of the Stability 
and Growth Pack, we quantitatively analysed all the assessments published in the 2015-2019 
surveillance cycles. We focused on ex post compliance assessments (for example, the assessments 
made in 2019 of compliance in 2018). Our analysis is included in the Annex. We find that in all 6 
cases when, in 2014-2018, the EB was breached but the SB change rule was not, the conclusion 
was more lenient than what the EB suggested. Among the 14 cases when the SB change rule was 
breached, but the EB not in 2014-2018, the conclusion was more lenient than what the structural 
balance suggested in 12 cases. Furthermore, in the three cases when one of the indicators 
suggested “significant deviation”, no Significant Deviation Procedure was launched.  
Certainly, the goal of the overall assessment is to consider various factors. Yet the fact that in the 
vast majority of cases when the two indicators delivered conflicting results, the conclusion from 
the more binding indicator is disregarded, suggests a very lenient approach in the assessment of 
compliance with adjustment path requirements. This finding has an important implication for a 
possible reform of the SGP to focus on an expenditure rule: in case of a reform, the expenditure 
rule should be taken much more seriously than the recent lenient consideration of the EB in the 
preventive arm of the SGP. 
We also note some changes regarding the Commission’s reporting practices in the annual 
assessments of the SCPs: 
o In 2014-2015, we find multiple cases where the structural balance change indicator is 
reported, while the EB is not. In all but one such cases, Member States exceed their MTO 
(i.e. structural balance level > MTO). In the remaining case, the Member State was below 
MTO (i.e. structural balance level < MTO), but in compliance with the structural balance 
change indicator. 
 
14 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/22_pt_sp_assessment_0.pdf  
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o In 2014-2016, the two adjustment path indicators were sometimes reported, even when 
Member States exceed their MTO, but not always. The reporting practice appears ad 
hoc. 
o From 2017 onwards, the two adjustment path indicators are never reported when 
Member States exceed their MTO (i.e. structural balance level > MTO). They are 
reported only when Member States are at or below their MTO. 
We recommend that Member States always report their EB and the corresponding expenditure 
aggregate in the Stability or Convergence Programmes, including when the MTO has been 
exceeded. We recommend the Commission to indicate the EBs in its assessment of the Stability 
or Convergence Programmes. While, in accordance with legislation, the EB does not matter for 
compliance when the structural balance exceeds the MTO, the EB and the corresponding 
expenditure aggregate provide important information as to the medium-term sustainability of 
the supposedly-favourable fiscal position, because an expenditure path much higher than 
potential growth might undermine fiscal sustainability. 
 PROPOSALS FOR EXPENDITURE RULE AND GOLDEN RULE 
Various proposals have been made for revising the European fiscal framework so that it focuses 
more, or only, on an expenditure rule combined with a debt target. A few proposals have also 
been made for the introduction of a golden rule that excludes certain public investments from 
the operational rule. The European Fiscal Board has also made such proposals (EFB 2018, 2019a, 
2019b).  
In Section 3.1, we assess whether an expenditure rule would be more reliable than a structural 
budget balance rule as the main operational tool for fiscal policy surveillance in the EU. This is 
followed by the assessment of the possible benefits and drawbacks of a golden rule in the EU 
fiscal framework and our proposal for an asymmetric golden rule in Section 3.2. However, we 
highlight that these rules should be considered in the broader context of the institutional 
framework for monitoring, incentivising and enforcing compliance, which is the subject of Section 
3.3. Finally, we offer some remarks on fiscal rules in the context of a major external shock in 
Section 3.4. 
3.1. Expenditure rule 
Several authors have proposed refocusing the EU fiscal framework on a modified expenditure 
rule, while at the same time simplifying the complexity of the fiscal framework and introducing 
new institutional solutions for compliance. Examples include Carnot (2014), Andrle et al (2015), 
Claeys et al (2016), Benassy-Quéré et al (2018), Feld et al (2018), Darvas et al (2018), OECD (2018), 
and EFB (2018, 2019a, 2019b). The gist of these proposals is the same: set a properly designed 
expenditure rule as the main operational target, leading to an appropriate medium-term public 
debt level target. That is, nominal expenditures (net of discretionary revenues measures) should 
not grow faster than medium-term nominal output, and they should grow at a slower pace in 
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countries with excessive debt levels15. Such a rule would not prohibit new government priorities 
on spending and revenues, but would constrain them. For example, if a new government is 
elected on the basis of an increased expenditure programme, that it is possible as long as the 
excess expenditures are matched by discretionary revenue increases. Or if the government wishes 
to cut taxes, then they should be compensated by reduced expenditures.  
Several authors propose to include the expenditure rule in a multi-annual framework, so that the 
rule would define multi-year-ahead ceilings for the level of expenditures, not just a limit on annual 
percent changes. 
At the same time, these proposals differ in the elements of the current fiscal framework they 
propose to keep, or in their suggested institutional set-up for implementation and control. 
3.1.1. Arguments for reforming the EU fiscal framework and refocusing it on an 
expenditure rule  
We see the following main arguments for reforming the fiscal framework, and in particular, for 
focusing on an expenditure rule: 
• the current framework is too complex, raising questions about ownership, transparency, 
predictability, consistency across countries and time, and on whether national 
policymakers internalise the EU framework; 
• the current framework relies on unobserved variables (potential output, the medium-
term potential growth rate, output gap and structural balance) which are subject to great 
uncertainty and estimation revisions, undermining the suitability of real-time fiscal 
decision-making16, 17; 
 
15 ‘Discretionary’ (as opposed to ‘automatic’ resulting from changes in economic activity) revenue and expenditure 
measures denote measures which result from changing certain parameters of revenues and expenditures. For example, 
a tax rate cut or narrowing the tax base are discretionary reductions in revenues, while e.g. a reduction in revenues 
resulting from lower GDP is non-discretionary (i.e. automatic) reduction in revenues. Similarly, increase in 
unemployment benefit payments due to higher unemployment is a non-discretionary (automatic) increase, while e.g. 
an increase due to increasing the duration, the replacement rate or coverage are discretionary measures. 
16 In a background work to this study, we found that the average one-year-after revision in real-time European 
Commission estimates for the change in the SB (using the EU’s Commonly Agreed Methodology) was between half 
and one percent of GDP in the 2010-2019 period, which is very large given that the baseline fiscal adjustment 
requirement is half a percent of GDP for countries not yet at their MTO. The range of the SB level estimates of the 
Commission, IMF and OECD is 1.0-1.2% of GDP, suggesting large uncertainty. Results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
17 Note that the ex-ante analysis by the Commission (e.g. an estimate made in May 2019 for the whole calendar year 
2019) assumes no change in fiscal policy. Revisions of estimates can occur if fiscal policy changes (e.g. a supplementary 
budget is adopted in the summer of the analysed year). 
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o the uncertainty in the estimates of medium-term potential growth rate (i.e. 10-
year average), which is used for the EB, is much smaller than the uncertainty in the 
estimates of levels and changes of SB18; 
o the estimation of SB relies on estimates of structural revenue too, which are 
distorted by revenue windfalls or shortfalls, because actual revenue elasticities are 
highly volatile in practice (Mourre, Poissonnier and Lausegger, 2019); 
• ex-post, estimates of SB turned out to be much more pro-cyclical than estimates of 
medium-term potential growth (see the next section), which has led to pro-cyclical fiscal 
tightening in many occasions, potentially lengthening recessions, even though the current 
set of rules is conducive to counter-cyclical fiscal policy in theory;19; 
• when a recession lingers for several years, EU fiscal rules allow for the slow-down or 
postponement of fiscal consolidation. However, economic arguments might call for a 
repeated fiscal stimulus, which is not allowed by the EU fiscal rules; 
• in case of hysteresis effects, pro-cyclical tightening in a recession can undermine the 
growth potential and thereby hinder the achievement of the budget deficit and debt 
reduction goals of fiscal tightening; 
• rules do not restrain fiscal policies well in good times, thereby some countries may enter 
a recession with a vulnerable fiscal position; 
• compliance with the rules has been weak, which might signal low trust in the rules;  
• rules were not able to protect the quality of the composition of public spending, and 
in particular, to prevent public investment from being penalised in recessions; 
• enforcement of the rules has been weak, as various flexibility clauses are regularly applied 
and excessive deficit procedures were not launched against countries with high debt 
 
18 Errors made in the estimation of SB and EB have implications for fiscal policy actions and hence for the actual budget 
balance. For example, suppose a first estimation shows that the SB in year T is forecast in T-1 as -1% of GDP, when the 
MTO is 0%, and hence the government has to implement fiscal consolidation. If  it turns out later that SB was 0% in 
year T, then fiscal consolidation was in vain and the actual budget deficit could have been larger in year T (and in 
subsequent years too). Similarly, if the medium-term potential growth rate is initially overestimated, then the 
corresponding growth of expenditure would lead to a higher budget deficit than planned, which will have to be 
corrected in later years if the medium-term potential growth rate is revised. Thus, an important question is budget 
balance implications of SB and EB estimation errors. In a background work to this study, we found, using average 
revision values in 2010-2018, that the budget balance implications of SB revisions is more than 5-times larger than that 
of the medium-term potential growth rate revisions. We also found that the range of the medium-term potential 
growth estimates of the Commission, IMF and OECD is about 0.2-0.3 percentage point, which is much narrower than 
the differences in SB estimates. These unpublished results are based on the background calculations to this study and 
are available from the authors upon request.  
19 Research also concluded that the so-called ‘fiscal multiplier’, which measures the impact of fiscal consolidation on 
output, is larger in a recession than in an expansion (e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Blanchard and Leigh, 
2013). This implies that in a recession, fiscal policy consolidation can deepen the recession more significantly than the 
impact of the same fiscal consolidation in an expansion phase. 
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ratios and insufficient pace of debt reduction when their nominal budget deficit was less 
than 3 percent of GDP; 
• the current framework increasingly relies on a bilateral process of fiscal surveillance, 
which discourages multilateral peer reviews; 
• the difficulties in enforcing a highly complex, non-transparent and error-prone system 
exposes the Commission to criticism from countries with both strong and weak fiscal 
fundamentals; 
• public expenditures are under the direct control of governments, while the structural 
balance is not; 
• the current framework places too much emphasis on annual, rather than longer-term 
performance indicators. 
Certainly, European fiscal rules are not the only culprit for fiscal misbehaviour. National 
institutions, national fiscal rules and a stability-oriented fiscal culture matter perhaps even more, 
as several EU countries with low public debt ratios demonstrate. But EU fiscal rules play a very 
important role in countries with weaker national institutions when these national institutions do 
not ensure stability-oriented policies. EU fiscal rules can also play important roles for countries 
with stronger institutions when a guidance is sought in a deep recession. 
3.1.2. Pro-cyclicality of structural balance and potential growth estimates 
An estimate is pro-cyclical if it varies in line with the economic cycle. For example, a potential 
output estimate for a particular year is pro-cyclical if potential output is seen higher in economic 
booms than in economic downturns. A concrete example might help to understand this 
phenomenon: 2019 was a year of economic expansion, while 2020 is a year of economic 
contraction. The 2018 level of potential output was estimated to be significantly larger in 2019 
than in 2020, thereby the estimate of the 2018 output gap made in 2020 is significantly larger 
than the estimate made in 2019. For example, the 2018 French output gap was estimated at 0.36% 
of potential output in May 2019 and 0.96% in May 2020. The corresponding estimates for the 
2018 Danish output gap were -0.46% in May 2019 and -0.03% in May 202020. In this section we 
explore whether these revisions are due to revision of historical output data or resulted from the 
estimation methodology. While we analyse European Commission estimates, we highlight that 
most if not all other institutions estimating potential outputs and structural balances also revise 
their estimates in a pro-cyclical manner. 
Such pro-cyclicality of estimates has important implications for the structural balance rules. In an 
expansionary phase, the level of potential output seems higher, thereby the output gap seems 
lower and the structural balance higher. If the structural balance is used as the major guideline 
of fiscal policymaking, then deficits and debt levels are not reduced as much as they should be. 
 
20 The source of the May 2019 forecast is: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-performance-
and-forecasts/economic-forecasts/spring-2019-economic-forecast-growth-continues-more-moderate-pace_en. The 
source of the May 2020 forecast is: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-performance-and-
forecasts/economic-forecasts/spring-2020-economic-forecast-deep-and-uneven-recession-uncertain-recovery_en. 
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On the contrary, in a recession phase, the level of potential output seems lower, thereby the 
output gap higher and the structural balance lower. This induces more fiscal consolidation than 
the fiscal consolidation requirement would be in the absence of pro-cyclical estimates.  
Moreover, pro-cyclicality of estimates could have perverse economic effects in the presence of 
hysteresis effects, if pro-cyclical estimates guide fiscal policy. That is, if fiscal tightening in a 
recession unduly results from a pro-cyclical estimate, then unemployment can increase. But 
unemployment, if persistent, might erode skills and lead to exits from the labour force, thereby 
reducing the quantity and quality of labour. In turn, this can deepen the recession and limit the 
speed of the subsequent recovery. Reduced innovation activities in a recession can also have 
lasting adverse effects on productivity. 
Eyraud et al (2017) find that EU Member States, like many other countries, have pursued a pro-
cyclical fiscal policy and prevented automatic stabilizers from operating freely. Dolls et al (2019) 
corroborate this finding as they concluded that while automatic stabilisers have played an 
important role in the early phase of the financial and economic crisis in 2008/2009, their 
countercyclical effect was partly offset in some Member States by a pro-cyclical fiscal stance in 
other years, in particular throughout the period 2011-2016. 
However, Eyraud et al (2017) also find that while fiscal outcomes were pro-cyclical, the fiscal plans 
presented in the Stability or Convergence Programs were non-cyclical, in the sense that there was 
no statistically significant association between the planned change in the structural balance and 
the expected change in output gap. The different results for fiscal plans and fiscal outcomes 
further highlights the unsuitability of the structural balance as an operational target. 
European Commission (2019a) also finds evidence of a pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour since 2000, 
implying that discretionary fiscal policy tightens in bad times and loosens in good times. At the 
same time, European Commission (2019a) also finds that the respect of fiscal rules seems to have 
mitigated the procyclicality of fiscal policy in the EU, by listing three circumstances which are 
associated with lower procyclicality: 1) meeting the requirements of the preventive arm of the 
SGP, 2) having lower headline deficits, and 3) having lower debt levels. European Commission 
(2020b) corroborates these findings. This leads to the question about the reasons for the lack of 
compliance by several Member States. 
Fatás and Summers (2018) and Fatás (2019) find pro-cyclicality in estimates of potential output 
in the EU. They argue that a vicious circle might have been at work: low GDP growth after the 
great recession was seen as structural, so that potential output estimates were revised downward. 
This led policymakers to believe that further fiscal policy adjustments were needed. The 
successive rounds of fiscal contractions might have caused further reductions in potential output 
that validated the initial pessimistic estimates. Coibion et al (2018) also show that potential output 
estimates respond to demand shocks that only have transitory effects on output. 
We find evidence of pro-cyclicality in potential output and structural balance estimates by looking 
at the May 2020 European Commission forecasts. Due to the coronavirus pandemic, GDP growth 
forecasts were massively revised downward for 2020, between 7 and 12 percentage point 
(difference between the May 2020 forecast and the May 2019 forecast for 2020). This is quite 
reasonable: the pandemic is an unforeseen external shock that dramatically impacts European 
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economies. In May 2019, the Commission forecasted that the EU27 economic will grow by 1.7% 
in 2020. A year later, in May 2020 the new forecast is -7.4%, so the revision of the EU27 the 2020 
GDP growth rate is -9.1%, a really huge downward revision in the 2020 outlook. However, what 
happens in 2020 cannot impact economic developments in 2018, which has already passed. 
Thereby, a 2020 shock should not impact estimates of potential output and structural balance for 
2018, but in practice it did, in a pro-cyclical way. 
A partial reason for the revision of 2018 potential output and structural balance estimates is the 
revision of actual GDP data for 2018 and earlier years. Statistical offices sometimes refine their 
first data releases based on more detailed data and revise their methodologies, which lead to 
revisions in data. For example, Irish growth in 2018 was estimated 6.7% in May 2019, but 8.2% in 
May 2020 (see the tallest blue bar on the left of the first block of Figure 1). Obviously, the causes 
of potential output and structural balance revisions should distinguish between historical data 
revisions (which have no implications on possible pro-cyclicality of potential output estimates) 
and revisions resulting from the changed economic outlook (which has implications for pro-
cyclicality). Therefore, in the rest of this section, we focus on the 16 countries for which historical 
GDP growth data (i.e. 2018 in this case) was not revised (or only to a very small extent, defined 
as less than 0.2 percentage points in absolute terms). While our focus is on these 16 countries, 
for completeness we report values for all 28 countries that were members of the European Union 
in 2018. 
Since the COVID-19 pandemic caused a major negative economic shock in 2020 and led to 
downward revisions in earlier forecast levels of actual output for 2020 and beyond, and the CAM 
for estimating potential output also uses a sample extended by four years ahead with forecasts, 
it is not surprising that estimates of potential output (and related indicators like its medium-term 
growth rate, output gap, structural balance) were subject to pro-cyclical revisions, including 
estimates for 2018, but also for years before and after 201821. The question we analyse is the 
magnitude of procyclicality of these estimated indicators and the impact of pro-cyclical revisions 
on the fiscal policy.  
For the 16 countries without significant data revisions, the 2018 output gap estimate was revised 
upwards by 0.81 percentage point on average in May 2020 (compared to May 2019 estimates), 
while the corresponding revision of the 2018 structural balance is -0.37 percentage point (blocks 
2 and 3 of Figure 1). That is, due to the pandemic external shock hitting the EU economy in 2020, 
the 2018 level of potential output is seen lower, thereby the 2018 output gap is seen higher and 
the 2018 structural balance is seen lower than a year earlier22. This is a pro-cyclical revision. 
 
 
21 It is also possible that the 2020 pandemic reduces the ‘true’ level of potential output in 2020 and in subsequent 
years, if hysteresis effects are present or if it leads to pro-cyclical fiscal tightening, as we have discussed earlier in this 
section. Obviously, the 2020 pandemic cannot reduce the ‘true’ level of 2018 potential output, only its estimated value. 
22 Note that these calculations consider only those 16 countries for which GDP data revisions were minor or zero, and 
hence not new GDP data, but the pandemic shock (which reduced GDP outlook for 2020 by more than 9% on 
average in the EU) is the main reason for potential output and structural balance revisions.  
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Figure 1: Revisions for 2018 – difference between May 2020 and May 2019 estimates 
 
Source: calculations based on European Commission forecasts published in May 2020 and May 2019. 
Note: values show the difference between May 2020 and May 2019 estimates for 2018. Countries are ordered according 
to the revision in actual GDP growth data for 2018. The 2018 medium-term potential growth for the expenditure 
benchmark refers to the average rate of potential growth in 2013-2022 (fourth block). The last block shows average 
potential growth rate revision in the alternative period of 2013-2018. 
The 2018 medium-term potential growth is also revised downward for most countries in a pro-
cyclical manner (blocks 4 and 5 of Figure 3). For calculating the EB, the 2018 medium-term 
potential growth rate is the average potential growth rate over 2013-2022, which also includes 
forecast values. Considering again the 16 countries for which historical GDP revisions were small, 
the 2018 medium-term potential growth rate (represented as the average of 2013-2022 growth) 
has been revised downward by 0.21 percentage point on average. Given that primary 
expenditures amount to about 45 percent of GDP on average in the EU, a 0.21 percentage point 
lower expenditure growth impacts the budget balance by 0.095 percentage point. This pro-
cyclical impact is just a quarter of the pro-cyclical impact of the structural balance revisions. 
Due to uncertainties in forecasts, we recommend excluding forecasted figures from medium-
term potential growth calculations beyond the forecast made for the current year. That is, we 
recommend not to base calculations on the t-5 to t+4 period (e.g. from 2015 to 2024 in the 2020 
analysis), but rather on the-5 to t period (e.g. from 2015 to 2020 in the 2020 analysis).  
For the 2018 example, following this recommendation would have meant calculating average 
potential growth over 2013-2018. The revisions would be smaller in this case, as we can see from 
comparing the fourth and fifth blocks of Figure 3. Considering again the 16 countries for which 
historical GDP data revisions were small, the average downward revision of the 2013-2018 
average potential growth rate was 0.075 percentage point. That is, considering that primary 
expenditure accounts for about 45% of GDP, the impact of this revision on the budget balance is 
0.034 percentage points of GDP, which is just 1/11th of the impact of pro-cyclical structural 
balance revision.  
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Heimberger and Truger (2020) reach a similar conclusion on pro-cyclicality by making a detailed 
analysis of the revisions in German potential output, output gap and structural balance estimates. 
While the Commission forecasts that the German structural balance will be -0.5% of GDP in 2021, 
which might necessitate fiscal consolidation, without the pro-cyclical revision in potential output 
the structural balance forecast would have been a 0.2% surplus. Thus, Germany’s fiscal space is 
reduced by 0.7% of GDP due to the pro-cyclical model-based estimates. They find that the effect 
of the German fiscal rules is even stronger than the European fiscal rule. If the suspension of the 
European and German fiscal rules will be revoked in 2021, the German government will be forced 
to cut its deficit earlier than it should23. 
3.1.3. Proposals of the European Fiscal Board 
There are several proposals for a better fiscal framework that aim to address the problems 
described above. Among these, the one set forth by the European Fiscal Board (EFB) has a special 
importance, because the EFB is an independent advisory board of the European Commission and 
the President of the European Commission specifically asked the EFB in January 2019 to carry out 
an assessment of the current EU fiscal rules. We summarise and evaluate the EFB’s proposal (EFB 
2019a, 2019b), which includes the following four main elements: 
• a single fiscal anchor: a debt ratio objective and a declining path towards it; 
• a single indicator of fiscal performance: a ceiling on the growth rate of net primary 
expenditures for countries with public debt in excess of 60% of GDP, but not for countries 
with a lower debt ratio; 
• a golden rule to exclude certain public investments from the expenditure aggregate 
subject to the ceiling; 
• a general escape clause (possibly applicable for each country separately), parsimoniously 
applied and triggered on the basis of independent economic analysis, provided both by 
the independent fiscal institution of the country concerned and a more autonomous (than 
currently) Commission staff. 
In this section, we focus on the expenditure rule proposal, while section 3.2.3 discusses the EFB’s 
golden rule proposal. 
The net expenditure aggregate proposed by the EFB excludes interest payments, non-
discretionary unemployment benefit payments, and certain public investments under the golden 
rule. It is also adjusted to account for discretionary changes in government revenues. This 
proposal deviates from the current expenditure aggregate of the EB as it replaces the exclusion 
of expenditure on Union programmes fully matched by Union funds revenue with a limited 
golden rule24. 
 
23 Methodological issues and results for further countries are discussed in Heimberger (2020). 
24 We review the limited golden rule proposal of the EFB in Section 3.2, yet we already draw the attention that it 
significantly differs from the current rule excluding only Union programmes fully matched by Union funds revenue. 
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To address the problem of short-termism resulting from the reliance on annual data, EFB (2019a, 
2019b) proposes to set the ceiling of net expenditure growth for a period of three years and 
recalculate it thereafter. They also propose a ‘compensation account’ in which deviations from 
planned net primary expenditure growth are accumulated25. Such a compensation account would 
be subject to some maximum and a requirement to de-cumulate in the case of windfall gain. 
The ceiling for the growth rate of the net expenditure aggregate would be the trend rate of 
potential output growth, with correction calibrated to achieve the country-specific public debt 
ratio target (see below). Member States with a debt ratio below 60% of GDP would not be subject 
to a net expenditure ceiling, but would still have to observe the 3% nominal deficit threshold. 
As regards the fiscal anchor, the gross public debt to GDP ratio, EFB (2019a, 2019b) proposes to 
eliminate the uniform rule for reducing the excess over the 60% threshold by 1/20th of the excess 
in each year. Instead, the EFB recommends country-specific debt targets for a seven-year period 
(coinciding with the duration of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework) and a new multilateral 
agreement adopted by the Council. The EFB also proposes to incorporate considerations from 
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) and the assessment of the appropriateness of 
the euro area fiscal stance in the determination of the expenditure growth ceiling. Thereby, high-
debt countries would commit to a net government expenditure path that reduces the debt ratio 
to the agreed target, while low-debt countries would commit to a binding net expenditure path, 
which would include growth-enhancing public investments with cross border effects. Countries 
with large current account deficits would commit to a lower public expenditure growth path, 
while countries with an excessive current account surplus would commit to a faster expenditure 
growth path. 
In our assessment, the EFB (2019a, 2019b) proposal for an expenditure rule would lead to a 
marked improvement over the current rules, which excessively rely on the estimated structural 
balance, but we also recommend some modifications to it. We see the following advantages: 
o Unlike the structural balance, public expenditures are observable in real time and are 
directly controlled by the government26. 
o While the basis for the benchmark for expenditure growth would be the medium-term 
potential rate of growth, which is subject to estimation errors, our background 
calculations for this study show that the typical revisions, the differences between the 
estimates by the European Commission, IMF and OECD, as well as the 2020 pro-cyclical 
 
25 The proposed ’compensation account’ is similar to the ’adjustment account’ proposed by, for example, Darvas et al 
(2018): “Limited deviations between actual and budgeted spending could be absorbed by an ‘adjustment account’ that 
would be credited if expenditures net of discretionary tax cuts run below the expenditure rule, and debited if they exceed 
it. These types of accounts exist in Germany and Switzerland. If a country passes a budget with no excessive spending but 
realised spending is above the target, the overrun could be financed without a breach of the rule, provided that the deficit 
in the adjustment account does not exceed a pre-determined threshold (e.g. 1 percent of GDP). If the threshold has been 
breached, the country violates the fiscal rule.” 
26 Concerning the current expenditure benchmark, European Court of Auditors (2018) also noted that “Focus on the 
expenditure benchmark places a stronger emphasis on those policy levers directly controlled by government and it is more 
predictable than the SB indicator.” 
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revisions, are markedly smaller for the medium-term potential growth rate than for the 
structural balance27. 
o The country-specific seven-year ahead debt reduction target, which is proposed to be 
used to set the ceiling of expenditure growth rate, lessens the importance of the medium-
term potential growth rate in the determination of the multi-year ceiling28.  
o The multi-year ahead debt reduction target would also smooth the transition from the 
current framework to the new framework. Otherwise, countries that have similar debt 
levels and potential growth rates would be subject to similar expenditure limits, even if 
they have very different budget deficits. But the multi-year ahead country-specific debt 
reduction target would be set considering the starting economic and fiscal position of the 
country, considering a wide range of indicators and circumstances. 
o We recommend, in line with Darvas et al (2018), that the country-specific debt reduction 
target be set by a joint effort of the government of the country concerned, the national 
fiscal council, the European Fiscal Council and the European Commission, and be 
approved by the Council (see further discussion of the institutional framework in Section 
3.3). 
o The expenditure rule has an ‘embedded’ cyclical stabilisation property: cyclical revenue 
increases have no effect on the expenditure ceiling – inducing stronger fiscal discipline in 
good times, compared to the current rules – and the rule does not require cyclical revenue 
shortfalls to be offset by lower expenditure in a downturn. 
o The expenditure rule reduces an important source of pro-cyclicality of the current rules. 
Indeed, a large body of literature finds that the pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy is strongly 
related to expenditures rather than revenues.  
Examples for the last point include Turrini (2008), who found that pro-cyclical bias in good times 
is an entirely expenditure-driven phenomenon in the euro area and expenditure rules can be 
helpful to curb the expansionary bias of fiscal policy. Holm-Hadulla et al (2012) confirmed that 
expenditure rules reduce pro-cyclical bias. Based on literature surveys, Fabrizio and Mody (2010) 
and Darvas and Kostyleva (2011) gave the highest point to expenditure rules among the various 
fiscal rules when designing fiscal institution quality indices, supported by literature surveys. 
Andrle et al (2015) proposed an expenditure rule for the EU, supported by literature review and 
model simulations. Belu Manescu and Bova (2020) confirm that while fiscal policy was indeed 
pro-cyclical in the EU over the 1999-2016 period, the magnitude of the pro-cyclical bias is lower 
in presence of expenditure rules. Moreover, they find that the better the expenditure rule design 
in terms of legal base, independent monitoring, consequences for non-compliance or coverage, 
the stronger the mitigating effect. European Commission (2020b) corroborates the finding of pro-
cyclical fiscal policy since 2000 and that the procyclicality seems to be lower based on the 
 
27 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
28 This seven-year ahead debt reduction target proposal of EFB (2019a, 2019b) is rather similar to the five-year ahead 
debt reduction proposed by Darvas et al (2018). 
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expenditure benchmark than the change in the structural balance. Counterfactual simulations 
based on a small fiscal model suggests that strict compliance with the expenditure benchmark 
would have resulted in a slightly more growth-friendly adjustment compared with a strict 
compliance with the structural balance requirement. The reason for this is that compliance with 
the expenditure benchmark would have required a larger (smaller) fiscal adjustment in good (bad) 
times. 
However, we also express some disagreements with the proposal of the EFB (2019a, 2019b). 
Specifically, EFB recommends that Member States with a debt ratio below 60% of GDP would not 
be subject to a net expenditure ceiling, but would still have to observe the 3% deficit rule. 
Countries with a public debt ratio below 60% of GDP also need an operational target, and we 
find the 3% deficit criterion not suitable. It is not conducive to any of the goals of a fiscal 
framework, i.e. long-term fiscal sustainability of the public debt, countercyclical fiscal policy in 
both good and bad times, and preserving the quality of public investment. Therefore, we 
recommend that the expenditure rule be the operational target, along with a country-specific 
medium-term debt target, for all EU countries. 
We welcome the proposals of EFB for stronger economic and fiscal policy coordination in the EU, 
whereby macroeconomic imbalances and considerations for the aggregate fiscal stance of the 
euro area would be also considered when setting the desired path of public expenditures. 
However, we fear that disagreements over the causes and remedies of current account deficits 
and surpluses, as well as over the desired aggregate fiscal stance of the euro area, are so large 
that complicating the fiscal framework with such discussions would risk an inefficient and 
ineffective system. 
 
3.1.4. Cyclical stabilisation by an expenditure rule 
To illustrate the cyclical stabilisation property of an expenditure rule, we run a simple and non-
comprehensive simulation. For each year, we calculate what a particular rule would have implied, 
using actual real-time data. We exclude from expenditures: interest payments, all unemployment 
benefit payments and one-off expenditures between 2009 and 2012 (e.g. bank rescues and other 
one-time costs). For calculating the expenditure ceiling, we use the six-year moving average of 
the potential rate of growth plus the 2% inflation objective of the ECB (as suggested by Claeys et 
al, 2016). We do not correct for discretionary revenue changes (due to lack of data). Our 
calculation is therefore partial due to the following reasons: 
Actual aggregate:  
o Our simulation is not a comprehensive counter-factual simulation, because the 
application of the expenditure rule in a year would have altered economic and 
fiscal outcomes (such as the level of public expenditure, GDP, public debt), which 
would have been different than what are actually observed in the data; 
o We exclude all unemployment payments, not just discretionary ones; 
o We do not correct for discretionary revenue changes; 
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o We do not correct for public investment. 
Ceiling: 
o We do not correct for debt levels; 
o We do not correct for expenditure overruns. 
Yet even our simple and partial simulation illustrates the stabilising property of an expenditure 
rule. 
Figure 2: Partial simulation results: actual expenditure growth and real-time ceiling (percent per 
year) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on total, interest and unemployment general government expenditures data from Eurostat’s 
‘General government expenditure by function (COFOG) [gov_10a_exp]’ dataset, and one-off expenditures from the 
May 2020 (for the period starting in 2010) and May 2014 (for the pre-2010 period) versions of the AMECO dataset.  
Note: Nominal public expenditure excluding interest expenditure and unemployment expenditures in the whole period 
and one-off expenditures in 2009-2012, but no correction is made for discretionary revenue changes and general 
government investment. The real-time estimate of potential output growth uses the EU’s CAM, but a six-year average 
(covering the preceding five years and the year of estimation) instead of the ten-year average currently used for the 
EB. The expenditure limit corrects the real-time potential growth estimate with the 2 percent inflation benchmark of 
the ECB. No correction is made for public debt and expenditure-overrun. 
In the pre-crisis period, the analysed simplified expenditure rule would have disciplined Spain, a 
country that experienced housing booms and rapid increases in pro-cyclical public expenditures. 
This  simplified expenditure rule would also have disciplined Italy, and more so if a public debt 
correction was also considered, due to Italy’s high debt. On the contrary, Germany could have 
spent more in 2003-07, while spending in France was more or less in line with the rule.  
After 2008, all countries reduced actual expenditure growth below the ceiling, applying pro-
cyclical fiscal tightening. The expenditure rule would have allowed for more counter-cyclicality in 
fiscal policies than those that were actually implemented in many EU countries.  
For all the reasons discussed so far, we conclude that an expenditure rule would be superior to 
the current structural budget balance rule as the main operational tool for fiscal policy 
surveillance in the EU. 
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3.2. Golden rule 
In the terminology of the literature on fiscal rules, a golden rule is a fiscal rule that excludes a 
measure of capital expenditure29 from the computation of certain fiscal requirements (be it the 
budget deficit or the expenditure benchmark). The EU fiscal framework already includes a limited 
golden rule in the form of a so-called ‘investment clause’. This section first compares public 
investment within and outside the EU and elaborates the possible role of the EU fiscal framework 
in the very low public investment levels (Section 3.2.1). The EU’s investment clause, and the Italian 
and Finnish experiences with it, is discussed in Section 3.2.2. This is followed by a discussion of 
the benefits and drawbacks of golden rules in Section 3.2.3, while Section 3.2.4 recommends an 
asymmetric golden rule. 
3.2.1. Public investment development and EU fiscal rules  
General government fixed capital formation, that for simplicity we refer to as ’public investment’, 
was a major victim of European fiscal consolidation efforts after the 2008 global and the 
subsequent euro-area crises30. Even in 2019, seven years after the peak of the euro crisis, net 
public investment (which is gross investment minus the depreciation of capital stock) on average 
in the EU was just a fraction of those in the US and the UK (as a share of GDP, see Figure 3). 
 
 
29 Proponents of golden rule consider different types of expenditures to exclude: most proposals consider general 
government fixed investment, while others consider other types of growth-enhancing spending too. Beyond the 
general government, state owned enterprises might be considered too. Some proponents consider gross investment, 
others net investment. 
30 See, for example, the analyses in Barbiero and Darvas (2013) and EFB (2019a). 
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Figure 3: Net public investment and public debt in 2019 (% GDP) 
 
Source: May 2020 version of the European Commission’s AMECO dataset. Note: for the United States, AMECO reports 
federal government debt, but for comparability with general government debt reported for European countries, we 
added US state and local debt to federal debt. 
Note: net public investment refers to ‘net fixed capital formation of the general government’. 
While the optimal level of public investment depends on various factors including the quantity 
and quality of public capital, the low average EU level of public investment is surprising. Market 
conditions are also very favourable: several European governments can borrow even at negative 
interest rates, while others can borrow at rates below the expected inflation rate. 
At the same time, there is a large variation in terms on net investment across the EU. In five 
countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus and Spain), net public investment was negative in 2019, 
implying that the capital stock was declining. On the other end, net public investment was 
relatively high in several central European Member States and in Luxembourg and Sweden. 
Central European countries benefit from large amount of EU structural fund payments, which 
presumably boost public investment, but Luxembourg and Sweden receive little EU funding. 
A recurring question in the debate around the relation between public investments and fiscal 
rules relates to the last decades’ sovereign debt crisis. Did EU fiscal rules encourage pro-cyclical 
cuts to public investment in during the 2008-2012 crisis period and keep public investment low 
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in the subsequent recovery years? Or were other factors more important? A thorough 
examination of this issue would be very demanding, yet Figure 3 provides some elements of the 
answer.  
Countries with higher debt levels tend to have lower public investments (as a share of GDP), while 
some low-debt countries (Luxemburg and Sweden) have relatively high public investment rates. 
This could suggest that the fiscal constraints, but not necessarily fiscal rules, limit public 
investment. Yet public investment is relatively low in Germany and the Netherlands too, two 
countries with relatively low debt levels and budget surpluses in 2019 well above those required 
by European fiscal rules. Therefore, low public investment seems to be a political choice in 
Germany and the Netherlands and an alternative fiscal rule that privileged public investment 
might have not boosted public investment. 
So, what was the role of fiscal rules in high- debt countries? In the massive post-2008 euro-area 
sovereign debt crisis, countries with high debt levels faced a dual pressure to consolidate their 
public finances: partly because of strong market pressure, and partly because of the fiscal 
consolidation requirements under the excessive deficit procedure. It is difficult to disentangle 
these two effects31. If market pressure was the primary reason, then public investment would 
probably have been cut irrespective of the fiscal rule in place, because the political cost of cutting 
public investment is presumably lower than that of cutting various entitlement spending. But if 
the main reason was to obey with the fiscal rule, then the type of rule would have mattered. A 
golden rule that disregards public investment could have changed the composition of fiscal 
consolidation if cutting public investment would have had no impact on meeting the fiscal 
targets. This might have changed the composition of fiscal adjustment, lowering the cuts in public 
investment.  
Whatever was the main reason, fiscal consolidation that concentrates on cutting public 
investment slows down the recovery, because public investment has been found to have a greater 
impact on economic growth than most other types of public spending, especially under weak 
economic conditions32. 
A possible way to protect public investments at the expense of cutting other public expenditure 
could be the introduction of a golden rule broader than the one currently existing in the EU fiscal 
framework.  
3.2.2. The investment clause: too little too seldom 
Since 2015, the EU fiscal framework includes a narrow golden rule which is called the ‘investment 
clause’33. The clause allows for temporary deviations from the MTO (or from the adjustment path 
 
31 Research by European Commission (2020) does not find evidence that fiscal rules hamper public investment. 
32 See for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Baum et al (2012). 
33 See at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/stability-growth-pact-flexibility/  
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towards it), amounting to at most 0.5% of GDP34, for a period of maximum three years, under the 
following (rather strict) conditions35:  
o GDP growth is forecast to be negative or to remain well below its potential (resulting in 
negative output gap greater than 1.5% of potential GDP); 
o the Member State remains in the preventive arm at the time of the assessment of the 
application for use of the clause; 
o an appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP deficit reference value is 
preserved; 
o only national co-financing of projects co-funded by the EU under the Structural and 
Investment Funds, Trans-European-Network, Connecting Europe Facility and the European 
Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) are allowed; 
o the projects financed must have positive, direct and verifiable long-term budgetary effects; 
o co-financed expenditure should not substitute for nationally-financed investments, so that 
total public investments do not decrease; 
o the maximum initial distance of the structural balance from the MTO is 1.5% of GDP, so that 
in the benchmark case of an annual adjustment of 0.5% of GDP, the Member State can achieve 
its MTO within the four years; 
o In the period of adjustment towards the MTO, the clause can be applied only once. 
 
As a result of these restrictive conditions, only two countries, Italy and Finland, have so far applied 
for the investment clause.  
Italy requested a 0.3% of GDP deviation in 2015 for the 2016 budget, of which 0.25% was granted 
under conditions36, but this flexibility for 2016 was retroactively reduced to 0.21% of GDP in 2017, 
in light of the investments actually made in 2016, which was lower than planned37. The differences 
between the requested, the approved and the ex post revised deviations are minor compared to 
the wide differences in the estimates for the 2016 structural balance, which were -0.81% (in 2015), 
-1.65% (in 2016), -1.74% (in 2017), -1.42% (in 2018), -1.67% (in 2019) and -1.53% (in 2020). 
 
34 In case the Member State also benefits from the so-called ‘structural reform clause’ too, then the total cumulative 
temporary deviation allowed under the two clauses cannot exceed 0.75% of GDP. 
35 See the detailed specification on pages 22-25 of the Vade Mecum (European Commission, 2019). 
36 The conditions were: (i) the existence of credible plans for the resumption of the adjustment path towards the MTO 
as of 2017; (ii) the effective use of a deviation from the adjustment path for the purpose of increasing investments; and 
(iii) progress with the structural reform agenda, taking into account the Council recommendations. 
37 Italy's national expenditure on projects co-financed by the European Union and realised in 2016 was approximately 
EUR 3.5 billion, or 0.21% of GDP (from EUR 4.25 billion initially planned). Note that, in 2016, total public investment in 
Italy decreased, thus presumptively violating an eligibility criteria of the investment clause. However, as found by the 
EC, the decrease was largely driven by a drop in EU funding (from EUR 3.1 billion in 2015 to EUR 0.3 billion in 2016). 
Notwithstanding this drop in EU funding, Italian public investment actually increased (by EUR 1.1 billion). 
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Finland requested a 0.1% of GDP deviation in 2016 for the 2017 budget, which was granted. The 
flexibility was retroactively withdrawn in 2018 because outturn data for 2017 showed a decline in 
public investment in 2017 compared to the previous year, while investments linked to Union 
funds were estimated to have remained stable. Again, a 0.1% of GDP deviation is dwarfed by the 
revision of the 2017 structural balance estimates. The 2017 structural balance was estimated at -
1.54% in 2016, -1.34% in 2017, -0.14% in 2018, -0.66% in 2019 and -1.12% in 2020. 
Overall, extra room for manoeuvre offered by the investment clause was minuscule in the cases 
of the two countries that applied for it. This fact, along with the very strict criteria for application, 
brings into question the usefulness of this clause. 
3.2.3. Benefits and drawbacks of golden rules 
Golden rules are less frequently discussed than expenditure rules, and the views on the 
desirability of a golden rule differ. For example, Truger (2015) advocates a rule that excludes from 
the fiscal targets net public investment (as defined in the national accounts) minus military 
expenditures plus investment grants for the private sector. Bogaert (2016) proposes modifying 
the formula of the MTOs to factor in net public investment. Claeys et al (2019) call for a 
fundamental revision to the EU fiscal framework including a golden rule, but in the absence of 
such a revision, call for a revision of the investment clause (to allow for a more permanent 
exemption for green investment, even in good times).  The Bundesbank (2019) on the other hand, 
argues strongly against it, partly based on an evaluation of the pros and cons, and partly on 
Germany’s unfavourable experience with such a rule (which was in place until 2011). 
The main arguments in favour of a golden rule are38: 
o inter-generational fairness requires that the cost of public investment should be borne by 
future generations who will benefit from it and therefore capital expenditure should be 
financed through debt and not by taxes paid by the current generation; 
o in the presence of deficit limits, socially desirable public investment projects may not be 
undertaken, and a golden rule could help to avoid strategic underinvestment; 
o debt-financed productive public investment can improve fiscal sustainability in the medium- 
to long-term as it can increase potential growth; 
o in corporate accounting, the cost of investment is not charged to a single year when the 
investment is implemented, but distributed across the years of its use: this principle has merits 
and should be adopted in public sector fiscal rules by an appropriate golden rule (investments 
are currently smoothed over four years and only for the expenditure benchmark).  
On the other hand, the major arguments against a golden rule39: 
 
38 See for example Peletier et al (1999), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004), Turrini (2004), and Barbiero and Darvas (2013). 
39 See for example European Commission (2004) and Bundesbank (2019). The difficulty in measuring net public 
investment, which is the relevant variable for intergenerational equity (because net investment indicates the change in 
net, i.e. usabale, public assets), is also sometimes mentioned as a drawback. We regard this issue as less of a problem, 
because harmonised taxonomy and accounting rules, greater transparency over public investments and more control 
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o it could entail maintaining high deficit for long periods; 
o the difficulties in deciding about favoured investments which should be granted special 
budgetary treatment; 
o it might create distortions, with favoured investments (such as physical infrastructure) 
preferred to other forms of capital or current spending that might also be beneficial over the 
long run; and 
o there would be significant incentives to record current expenditure as capital spending. 
Against this background, the EFB concludes that further efforts need to be undertaken to improve 
the quality of public finances and to protect and foster public investment (EFB 2019a, 2019b). The 
EFB proposes the introduction of a limited golden rule that would exclude specific public 
investments from the EB, while avoiding overburdening the EU fiscal rules with too many 
conflicting objectives. 
The EFB’s variant of the Golden Rules has the following main features: 
• In order to avoid EU micro-management, the golden rule would focus on public 
investments already identified in the EU budget as growth-enhancing and of pan-
European value. These include, for example, investments in digital infrastructure and 
green projects. Member States could voluntarily top-up expenditures on projects beyond 
their co-financing commitments. 
• In order to mitigate the risk of national governments unduly classifying expenditures into 
the favoured investment category, the golden rule would be monitored by the 
independent national fiscal institution that would assess the governments’ classification 
of growth-enhancing expenditure. This could reduce the risk that governments unduly 
classify certain expenditure items as public investment. 
Note that the EFB does not specify the share of public investment that would fall under the golden 
rule, nor whether it would relate to gross or net public investment. We conjecture that the EFB 
considered gross public investment, since it reports data on gross public investment and does 
not even mention net public investment in EFB (2019a). 
3.2.4. Proposal for an asymmetric golden rule 
Due to the conclusions and arguments we put forward in the previous sections, we favour an 
asymmetric golden rule, as previously proposed in Barbiero and Darvas (2013). Such an 
asymmetric golden rule would vary along with the business cycle. In bad times (and in the first 
years of the ensuing recovery phase), the rule would work towards preserving net public 
investment by excluding it from the fiscal indicators of the SGP. Thereby, cutting public 
investment would be irrelevant from the perspective of the operational fiscal indicator (adjusted 
public expenditure growth in our preferred case; structural balance in the case of the current 
 
by the independent fiscal council and the national audit office can reduce measurement uncertainty. Also, the huge 
uncertainty in output gap and structural balance estimations did not prevent the inclusion of these concepts in the 
EU’s current fiscal framework. 
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framework). This could lead to a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal consolation, thereby 
limiting the fall in output and employment in the recession and recovery phases of the business 
cycle, and offering better growth prospects for the medium/long-term. The ceiling for 
expenditure growth and the debt level target should also be amended when the asymmetric 
golden rule is activated, otherwise excluding net investment from the expenditure aggregate 
does not create extra fiscal space, just alters the composition of fiscal consolidation. 
A crucial issue relates to the activation of the asymmetric golden rule. We do not recommend to 
base such a decision on the estimated output gap, which is a very unreliable indicator. Instead, 
the activation could be conditional on the fall in GDP and the golden rule could remain in place 
for, say, three years. In any case, the activation should be based on a proposal by the Commission, 
which should be informed by the opinion of the national and European fiscal councils (see our 
proposed institutional framework in section 3.3 below).  
But a golden rule should also account for the perverse incentives it may create in good times, 
such as an excessive preference for physical infrastructure (or any other component of public 
spending which are exempted under the golden rule) over other growth-related expenditure. 
That is why we propose that, as an economic recovery turns to an expansion, the extra fiscal space 
for public investment be gradually eliminated, for example, in equal steps over a period of three 
years. Thereby, the rule would limit the accumulation of persistent budget deficits. 
Irrespective whether a golden rule is introduced or not, we also advocate for a change in the way 
gross public investments are smoothed over time. Public investments can vary substantially from 
year to year. For example, when a significant infrastructure project starts, public investment in 
that year can be very large and small in subsequent years. In the current EB calculations, public 
investments are smoothed over a four-year period. This is a step in the right direction, but there 
is a better solution. The best way to treat public investment mirrors the way private companies 
treat private investment: the cost of the investment should be spread over all of its service life. 
The incorporation of our proposed asymmetric golden rule should be accompanied by the 
harmonisation of EU accounting and reporting practices concerning public investment. The 
investment budget of the government should be separated from the current budget and the 
transparency of public investments should be increased. The role of national independent fiscal 
council in the process should be strengthened, along with the EFB suggestion.  
3.3. Institutional setup 
While this study focuses on the content of the fiscal rules, the institutional framework for 
overseeing the rules is just as important. All the various contributions to the reform of the fiscal 
framework suggest changes to the institutional framework.  We discuss three aspects.  
First, most contributions suggest strengthening the role of national independent fiscal councils, 
provided that their minimum standards are raised. Jankovics and Sherwood (2017) document the 
significant differences between fiscal councils across the Member States in terms of the breadth 
of their mandates, their resources and their visibility in public debates. These differences suggest 
that some of them are fairly efficient, while others are barely noticeable. They should be 
independent, competent and effective (OECD, 2016). They could be entrusted with making 
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recommendations on how to correct fiscal policies that violate EU rules. This would spare the 
Commission from being criticised and increase the sense of national ownership of 
recommendations. Member States might approve such a change in exchange for reduced 
Commission’s intrusion. 
Second, some contributions recommended the establishment of a European Fiscal Council 
(EUFC)40. The EUFC would have a structure similar to the ECB’s Governing Council: about six 
executive board members (with the same appointment and accountability procedures as for ECB 
executive members), plus the heads of national fiscal councils. The EUFC’s mandate should be to 
safeguard the proper implementation of the fiscal framework, with a focus on gross errors and 
cross-border spillovers. EUFC decisions would not be binding, but decisions would be made 
public in a timely manner, providing a major input into the Commission’s fiscal recommendations 
proposed to the Council. The EFB has a different mandate, and different appointment and 
accountability procedures, compared to what we recommend for the EUFC. 
Third, several contributions, including the EFB’s, highlight that financial sanctions for non-
compliance with the EU fiscal framework do not work. Fines face a time consistency problem: ex 
ante, everyone agrees that credible sanctions are important to enforce the SGP, but once the SGP 
is violated, imposing a sanction might do more political and economic harm than good. Instead, 
mixing various instruments would be preferable, related to surveillance, positive incentives, 
market discipline and increased political cost of non-compliance. For example, making access to 
funds from a potential central fiscal capacity conditional upon compliance with the EU fiscal rules 
could improve compliance, as suggested by EFB (2019a) and Darvas et al (2018). Access to a low-
cost European Stability Mechanism credit line is another incentive to observe the rules (Benassy-
Quéré et al, 2018), which already exists41. Stronger market discipline via the issuance of junior 
bonds in the case of non-compliance would be a powerful disincentive to deviate from the rule 
(Benassy-Quéré et al, 2018). The political cost of deviations could be increased by the requirement 
of the finance minister to publicly testify in front of the national parliament and in front of the 
European Parliament when the breach is serious42. 
 
3.4. Remarks on fiscal rules in the context of a major external shock 
Numerical rules cannot advise fiscal policy in the face of extraordinary external shocks such as 
the coronavirus pandemic of 2020. The virus hit governments two ways: tax revenues are 
depressed and fiscal spending increased due to discretionary stimulus measures, which are made 
possible by the activation of the general escape clause of the EU fiscal framework43 and the 
 
40 For example, Claeys et al (2016) and Darvas et al (2019). 
41 https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/esm_guideline_on_precautionary_financial_assistance.pdf  
42 The EP already has the right to invite a representative from a MS that is under EDP. We propose that this tool should 
be used actively.  
43 See 20 March 2020 Commission proposal: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_499 , and 
the endorsement by the Council three days later: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/ecofin/2020/03/23/ 
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temporary state-aid framework44. As a consequence, budget deficits and public debts balloon. 
However, unlike what was experienced in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, even 
Member States with vulnerable fiscal positions are not cutting spending and public investment 
(to our knowledge at the time of writing). On the contrary, they are adopting discretionary 
stimulus measures, though to a much smaller extent than Member States with low public debts45. 
Most likely, concerns on public debt sustainability limit the discretionary stimulus measures in 
Member States with vulnerable fiscal positions. 
There are major uncertainties around the depth and the duration of the recession, the speed and 
structure of the subsequent recovery, and the impact of ballooning public debts on sovereign 
solvency. 
Once the public health crisis abates and economic activity resumes, fiscal rules will be re-
activated. Excessive deficit procedures may be launched for many EU countries. But in the face of 
extreme uncertainty around structural budget balances and output gaps estimates, the current 
fiscal framework will be especially hard to implement and defend. We cannot exclude the 
possibility that the matrix defining the required adjustment in the structural balance (Table 1) will 
be adjusted in light of the new realities. If a second, but less severe, recession comes and the 
general escape clause will not be activated again, the current framework may not allow a new 
fiscal stimulus, which could prolong the recession.  
We believe that the revision of the EU fiscal framework proposed in this study would better equip 
governments to address the post-covid recovery phase than the rules as they stand today. In 
particular, a forward looking five- or seven-year-ahead debt target and the corresponding public 
expenditure growth path would balance the need for fiscal consolidation and fiscal support to 
the economy. The built-in stabilisation features of the proposed expenditure rule would allow the 
automatic (economic cycle-driven) component of fiscal policy to adjust, if the speed of recovery 
deviates from the assumptions that were used to set the public debt reduction path. 
The period of EU fiscal rule suspension should be used to discuss, agree on and adopt the reform 
so that the new fiscal framework will apply when the COVID-induced suspension ends.  
 
 
44 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_496  
45 See Anderson et al (2020). 
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study analysed the EU fiscal framework’s structural balance and expenditure rules, and the 
various proposals for refocusing the fiscal framework on an expenditure rule and a golden rule. 
Main findings 
• In accordance with EU regulation, the expenditure benchmark (EB) is subordinate to the 
structural balance (SB), because the EB is only used to evaluate sufficient progress towards 
the medium-term objective (MTO) expressed in terms of the SB, or in rare cases when a 
country is exactly at the MTO. The EB does not matter once a country’s SB has reached a 
higher level than its MTO. Nevertheless, in 2016 the Commission and Council agreed to 
give a more prominent role to the EB. 
• The European Fiscal Board (EFB) highlighted an increasingly widespread tendency to 
adjust the EB in an ad-hoc manner to lower the consolidation requirement. 
• In some cases, the European Commission has used alternative potential growth estimates 
by questioning the appropriateness of the Commonly Agreed Methodology in its 
assessment of compliance with the rules of the preventive arm of the SGP. 
• We find that that the Commission has adopted a generally lenient approach in cases of 
conflict between the EB and SB criteria in the preventive arm of the SGP. In the large 
majority of cases, ‘compliance’ was concluded when only one of the two indicators was in 
deviation. Significant Deviation Procedures was not initiated when the EB suggested 
‘significant deviation’. 
• The structural budget balance – that is, the budget balance which excludes the impact of 
the economic cycle and one-off fiscal measures – is a sensible theoretical concept, but its 
estimation is subject to massive uncertainty. 
• The average one-year revision of the real-time estimate for the change in SB was between 
half and one percent of GDP in the 2010-2019 period, which is very large given that the 
baseline fiscal adjustment requirement is half a percent of GDP for countries not yet at 
their MTO. 
• The average revision to medium-term (i.e. 10-year average) potential growth was between 
0.1-0.6 percentage points in 2010-2018. This uncertainty has a smaller impact on the 
budget balance, also because primary public expenditures (which are subject to the EB) 
account for about 45 percent of GDP across the EU. 
• The range of the SB estimates made by the Commission, IMF and OECD is 1.0-1.2 percent 
of GDP, suggesting large uncertainty, while the range of medium-term potential growth 
estimates is much narrower at about 0.2-0.3 percentage points.  
• Earlier research confirmed the pro-cyclicality of potential output and structural balance 
estimates. 
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• We studied the May 2020 estimate revisions and found that the budget balance 
implications of the pro-cyclical revisions in the structural balance estimates is about four 
times larger than pro-cyclical revision of the medium-term potential growth estimates46. 
• There are many strong arguments for reforming the EU fiscal framework. There is a 
growing consensus in the literature on the benefits of an expenditure rule. The main 
advantages of dropping SB rules and focusing on an expenditure rule, which would be 
anchored to a country-specific medium-term (e.g. 5 or 7 years) debt reduction target, are: 
o Unlike the structural balance, public expenditures are observable in real time and 
are directly controlled by the government; 
o The uncertainty surrounding the medium-term potential growth rate estimate (10-
year average potential growth rate), which is used for the expenditure growth 
ceiling, is several factors smaller than the uncertainty around the SB estimate; 
o Anchoring expenditure ceilings to a medium-term debt reduction target lessens 
the importance of the medium-term potential growth rate in the determination of 
the required expenditure ceilings; 
o Anchoring expenditure ceilings to a medium-term debt reduction target would 
smooth the transition from the current framework to the new framework; 
o The expenditure rule has an ‘embedded’ cyclical stabilisation property; 
o The expenditure rule mitigates an important source of pro-cyclicality in the current 
rules. 
• Public investment was a major victim of European fiscal consolidation efforts after the 
2008 global and the subsequent euro-area crises. Even in 2019, net public investment 
(which is gross investment minus the depreciation of capital stock) on average in the EU 
was just a fraction of that in the US and the UK (as a share of GDP). 
• Countries with high public debts tend to invest less, while some countries (such as 
Germany and the Netherlands) with relatively low public debts invest little, which seems 
to be a political choice not related to fiscal rules. It is an open question whether fiscal rules 
or market pressure influenced public investment cuts in high-debt countries in times of 
fiscal consolidation. 
• The activation of the current EU investment clause requires very restrictive conditions. The 
only two cases of the activation of this clause allowed miniscule deviations in SB compared 
to the huge revisions of the SB, questioning the usefulness of this clause.  
• Golden rules are less discussed than expenditure rules, and views on the desirability of a 
golden rule differ. The possible main advantages (inter-generational fairness, avoiding 
strategic underinvestment, productive public investment ultimately improving fiscal 
sustainability through growth-boosting effects, applying sensible corporate accounting 
 
46 A pro-cyclical revision means that the estimate is revised in the same direction as the revision of the economic 
outlook. 
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principles to public investment) are at least partially outweighed by possible drawbacks 
(maintaining high deficits for long periods, difficulty in deciding about favoured 
investments, undue preference for favoured investments, incentive to record current 
expenditure as capital spending). We therefore prefer a golden rule which is asymmetric 
over the business cycles: it provides extra fiscal space in times of a recession, but not in 
times of expansion. 
• Activation of this proposed asymmetric golden rule should not depend on the unreliable 
estimate of the output gap, but instead on statistical data on GDP contraction, after an 
assessment by national and European fiscal councils, and should be based on a 
recommendation by the Commission. 
• The institutional framework for overseeing the rules is just as important as the rules 
themselves. There is a growing consensus in favour of strengthening the roles of national 
independent fiscal councils, while some authors have proposed the establishment of a 
European Fiscal Council with a structure similar to the ECB’s Governing Council. Several 
contributions highlight that financial sanctions for non-compliance with the EU fiscal 
framework do not work. 
• We believe that the revision of the EU fiscal framework proposed in this study would 
better equip governments to address the post-COVID-19 recovery phase, compared to 
the rules as they stand today.  
Recommendations 
• We recommend the reporting of the EB and the corresponding expenditure aggregate, 
also when the MTO has been exceeded. 
• We recommend the publication of the confidence intervals of the Commission’s potential 
output, output gap, medium-term potential growth and structural balance estimates. 
• We recommend changing the EU fiscal framework to include the following main elements: 
o Anchor: five-year ahead or seven-year ahead debt ratio change objective, to be 
set by a joint effort of the government of the country concerned, the national fiscal 
council, the European Fiscal Council and the European Commission, and be 
approved by the Council; 
o Operational target: multi-year ahead ceilings for public expenditure corrected for 
discretionary47 unemployment expenditure, interest expenditure and discretionary 
revenue changes, while public investment is treated as discussed in the next point; 
o Public investment: an asymmetric golden rule that excludes net public investment 
from the considered expenditure aggregate only in bad times, in a way to create 
extra fiscal space. This extra fiscal space would be gradually eliminated as the 
recovery strengthens. Current and investment budgets are separated. Investment 
costs are distributed over the entire service-life. Activation of the asymmetric 
 
47 Discretionary changes refer to changes resulting from the decisions of the authorities.  
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golden rule should be based on the contraction of economic output, and the 
opinion of national and European fiscal councils and the European Commission; 
o Ceiling for the operational target: compatible with the debt ratio objective; 
o Institutional framework: strengthened independent national fiscal councils with 
increased minimum standards and establishment of a European Fiscal Council with 
a structure similar to the European Central Bank’s Governing Council, while the 
Commission remains the institution that proposes recommendations to the 
Council of Ministers for adoption; 
o Financial sanctions: to be replaced with various instruments related to surveillance, 
positive incentives, market discipline48 and increased political cost of non-
compliance; and 
o A general escape clause: instead of the current general escape clause and the 
additional complex web of exceptions, a single general escape clause (possibly 
applied to each member state separately) could be triggered by the Council of 
Ministers, based on the recommendation of the Commission, which would take 
into account the opinions of the independent national fiscal council and the 
European Fiscal Council. 
• In order to adopt our proposal, legislative changes are needed to the Six-Pack regulations 
and the Fiscal Compact49. 
 
 
  
 
48 Market disciple means that the interest rate at which governments can borrow from the market is sensitive to 
markets’ assessment of public debt sustainability, that is, interest rates go up as markets’ trust in fiscal sustainability 
weakens. 
49 See the last section of Darvas et al (2018) for a detailed discussion. 
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ANNEX 
 
Quantitative analysis of the Commission’s assessment of Member States’ compliance with 
the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pack 
 
We analysed all the assessments published in the 2015-2019 surveillance cycles. We focused on 
ex post compliance assessments (for example, the assessments made in 2019 of compliance in 
2018). 
 
• In all 6 cases when, in 2014-2018, the EB benchmark was 
breached but the SB change rule was not, the conclusion was 
more lenient than what the EB suggested (Panel A, Table 3).50  
 
 
Indicator deviation Commission’s 
conclusion 
1 case of some EB deviation compliance 
2 cases of significant EB deviation some deviation 
3 cases of some EB deviation some deviation 
 
• Among the 14 cases when the structural balance change rule 
was breached, but the EB not in 2014-2018, the conclusion was 
more lenient than what the structural balance suggested in 12 
cases (Panel B, Table 3): 
 
Indicator deviation Commission’s 
conclusion 
1 case of significant SB change deviation compliance 
9 cases of some SB change deviation compliance 
2 cases of significant SB change 
deviation 
some deviation 
2 cases of some SB change deviation some deviation 
 
 
50 Note that, as per the Regulations mentioned above, the EB benchmark is not considered in the assessment of 
progress towards the MTO in cases where MTO is reached (even when EB suggests significant deviation). Therefore we 
only look at cases where MTO is not reached. 
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We also highlight that in all cases when the EB suggested ‘significant deviation’ and the structural 
balance change rule suggested ‘some deviation’, the final conclusion was ‘some deviation’ and 
therefore the Significant Deviation Procedures was not initiated. 
 
Table 3: Commission’s ex post assessments (at “t+1”) of compliance (at “t”) with the 
preventive arm of the stability and growth pact when the structural balance rule and the 
expenditure benchmark rule led to conflicting conclusions. 
A) Cases where the expenditure benchmark was binding 
Country Year MTO 
Structural 
balance 
based on 
freezing (1)  
Position 
vis-à-vis 
the MTO 
(2) 
Deviation 
from the 
structural 
balance 
change rule 
(3) 
Deviation 
from the 
expenditure 
benchmark 
multiplied 
by minus 
one (4) 
Commission 
conclusion 
Austria 2018 -0.5% -0.8% At or above the MTO 0.6% -0.3% Compliant 
Finland 2018 -0.5% -0.8% At or above the MTO 0.2% -0.2% Compliant 
Portugal 2018 0.3% -0.90% Not at MTO 0.3% -1.5% Some deviation 
United Kingdom 2018 -0.8% -1.70% Not at MTO 0.3% -0.4% Some deviation 
Belgium 2017 0.0% -1.50% Not at MTO 0.3% -0.4% Some deviation 
Portugal 2017 0.3% -1.80% Not at MTO 0.3% -0.5% Some deviation 
Slovakia 2017 -0.5% -1.40% Not at MTO 0.4% -0.1% Compliant 
Slovenia 2017 0.3% -1.60% Not at MTO 0.0% -0.7% Some deviation 
Austria 2016 -0.5% -0.9% At or above the MTO 0.1% -0.4% Some deviation 
Latvia 2016 -1.0% -0.7% At or above the MTO 0.9% -0.2% Compliant 
Lithuania 2015 -1.0% -0.4% At or above the MTO 0.9% -0.5% Compliant 
Austria 2014 -0.5% -0.4% At or above the MTO 0.1% -1.5% Compliant 
Estonia 2014 0.0% 0.2% At or above the MTO 0.7% -2.0% Compliant 
 
B) Cases where the structural balance change rule was binding  
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Country Year MTO 
Structural 
balance 
based on 
freezing (1) 
Position 
vis-à-vis 
the MTO 
(2) 
Deviation 
from the 
structural 
balance 
change rule 
(3) 
Deviation 
from the 
expenditure 
benchmark 
multiplied 
by minus 
one (4) 
Commission 
conclusion 
Finland 2016 -0.5% -0.9% 
Not at 
MTO -0.1% 0.5% Compliant 
Italy 2016 0.0% -1.6% 
Not at 
MTO -0.4% 0.1% Compliant 
Poland 2016 -1.0% -2.2% 
Not at 
MTO -0.4% 0.0% Some deviation 
Slovenia 2016 0.0% -1.7% 
Not at 
MTO -0.2% 0.0% Compliant 
Belgium 2015 0.75% -2.3% 
Not at 
MTO -0.4% 0.1% Some deviation 
Denmark 2015 -0.5% -0.50% 
At or 
above the 
MTO -0.3% 0.2% 
Compliant 
Ireland 2015 0.0% -2.0% 
Not at 
MTO -0.5% 0.7% Compliant 
Italy 2015 0.0% -0.7% 
Not at 
MTO -0.1% 0.2% Compliant 
Poland 2015 -1.0% -2.3% 
Not at 
MTO -0.2% 0.3% Compliant 
Bulgaria 2014 -1.0% -1.50% 
At or 
above the 
MTO -1.5% 1.0% 
Some deviation 
Finland 2014 -0.5% -0.90% 
At or 
above the 
MTO -0.8% 0.3% 
Some deviation 
Hungary 2014 -1.7% -2.20% 
At or 
above the 
MTO -0.4% 0.3% 
Compliant 
Italy 2014 0.0% -0.8% 
Not at 
MTO -0.1% 0.2% Compliant 
Slovakia 2014 -0.5% -2.0% 
Not at 
MTO -0.2% 0.8% Compliant 
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Source: Commission’s assessments of stability and convergence programmes, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact/stability-and-convergence-programmes_en  
Note: assessments of compliance in the previous year is reported, for example, the 2019 assessment whether the 
country complied in 2018. Colour codes:  
 Compliant 
 Not compliant 
 Some deviation 
 Significant deviation 
(1) Under the preventive arm of the SGP, the requirements in terms of the change in the structural balance and the 
expenditure benchmark for year t are set on the basis of the Commission's spring forecast of year t-1 and kept 
unchanged, or “frozen” afterwards (see European Commission, 2018, Box II.4.1: Freezing principle and unfreezing 
modalities, Report on Public Finances in EMU, p. 59). (2) Based on the relevant adjusted structural balance at year t-1. 
(3) One-year deviation from the required adjustment: The difference of the change in the structural balance and the 
required adjustment (corrected for the clauses, the possible margin to the MTO and the allowed deviation in case of 
overachievers). (4) One-year deviation adjusted for one-offs: Deviation of the growth rate of public expenditure (net 
of discretionary revenue measures and revenue increases mandated by law) from the applicable reference rate in terms 
of the effect on the structural balance. The expenditure aggregate used for the expenditure benchmark is obtained 
following the commonly agreed methodology. A negative sign implies that expenditure growth exceeds the applicable 
reference rate. 
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In the context of the review of the EU economic governance framework, this study examines 
two particular issues. First, whether an expenditure rule would be more reliable than a 
structural budget balance rule as the main operational tool for fiscal policy surveillance in 
the EU. Second, the possible benefits and drawbacks of introducing a golden rule to 
exclude certain types of investments from the operational fiscal rule are analysed. The 
study recommends revisions to the EU fiscal framework. 
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